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1 
Introduction 
 
Scholars have made considerable effort in recent years to flesh out a “thin ideology” that 
unites populists in Europe and Latin America. What right-wing populists in Europe and their 
left-wing counterparts in Latin America have in common is that they construct and nourish an 
antagonism between the people and the elite (e.g., Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). But 
why have recent manifestations of populism in Latin America been associated with the left, 
while right-wing populism has flourished much more than left-wing populism in Western 
Europe, at least until recently? In this contribution, I argue that populist mobilization 
strategies fall on fruitful ground where party systems do not adequately represent citizen 
preferences. This is a perhaps not a sufficient, yet a necessary condition for populist success. I 
argue that while populism is likely to have a common cause across regions and time – 
namely, an unresponsive party system that erodes the legitimacy of the established parties – 
the choice of the thick ideology populists use in their mobilization is not a coincidence. 
Rather, it matters very much which citizen preferences lack representation. Thus, we need to 
take into account all the relevant dimensions of party competition in a country and assess how 
each of these dimensions resonates with the populace.  
One of the central contributions I seek to make in this paper is to integrate the short-term 
factors populism scholars typically use in their explanations with long-term factors of party 
system change. Although I do not study short-term factors in much detail for reasons of space, 
the long-term evolution of the party system clearly either constrains or facilitates the strategic 
game between populists and mainstream parties. Populists will not be successful in a context 
with strong ideological divides between parties and where parties are linked to like-minded 
electoral constituencies. As we will see, the degree of segmentation and party-voter 
congruence traditional divisions in the party system engender takes us a long way to 
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explaining the breakthrough of populists in some West European and Latin American 
countries, and their lack of success in others.  
I explore the electoral potential for populist anti-establishment actors as well as the latter’s 
choice of either using economic policy or culturalist appeals by adopting a cross-regional 
perspective. In Western Europe, where the populist right achieved its breakthrough from the 
1980s onwards, I look at two cases of populist success and one case of failure. While party 
systems in Switzerland, France, and Germany were fairly responsive to voter preferences in 
terms of the traditional state-marked dimension of conflict in the 1970s, they differed in terms 
of their responsiveness along the libertarian-authoritarian divide, the second dimension of 
conflict prevalent in the 1970s. German parties were far more responsive along this “cultural” 
dimension than their counterparts in France and Switzerland. Jointly with their strategies in 
dealing with issues related to cultural liberalism and immigration in the 1980s and 1990s, 
German parties averted the entry of the extreme populist right in the party system. In the other 
two countries, the Swiss People’s Party and the French Front National successfully redefined 
cultural conflicts and entrenched themselves at one pole of a new cultural divide that 
encompasses all the elements we commonly use to define a cleavage (c.f. Bartolini and Mair 
1990).  
I compare these European cases to the breakthrough of new populist left parties in Latin 
America in the late 1990s and 2000s. Building on recent distinctions between the moderate 
and the populist left (Roberts and Levitsky 2011), I argue that the latter type was successful in 
countries where party systems lacked responsiveness along the classical economic dimension, 
pitting state intervention against market liberalism. The best example here is that of the 
Venezuelan party system, which had failed to offer voters contrasting economic policy 
propositions for several decades. The economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s then provided a 
window of opportunity for populist actors. Chile and Uruguay, on the other hand, featured 
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firmly entrenched center-left parties that contributed to high levels of congruence between 
party positions and voter preferences, strongly constricting the mobilization space for populist 
newcomers.  
This paper is structured as follows. I begin by presenting a theory of how established 
conflicts and alignments limit the space for populist actors. The pacification of these conflicts 
or the ideological convergence of mainstream parties provide space for challengers relying on 
populist anti-system messages. While all of these trajectories result in a gradual process of 
dealignment, the anti-establishment potential is especially large where the established parties 
form a cartel and employ strategies to prevent the entry of competitors (Katz and Mair 1995). 
As we know from the literature on dealignment and realignment, the adaptation of party 
systems to changing voter preferences then tends to manifest itself in a relatively short period 
of time in a number of “critical elections”. We should thus avoid putting too much emphasis 
on short-term factors when explaining populist success. In the third section, I justify the 
choice of cases to be included in the analysis along with a discussion of the political context 
in which populist actors were successful in Latin America and Western Europe, respectively. 
While I identify the relevant dimensions in these contexts drawing on prior research and 
secondary literature, the ensuing section explains in detail the data and methods I use to 
measure representational congruence in my six cases. The fifth section presents the results of 
the analysis, while the final section concludes. 
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Established conflicts and the potential for populist challengers 
 
Much of the literature has focused on proximate causes of the breakdown of parties or party 
systems, or of dealignment. Embedding these accounts in a more encompassing framework 
that includes proximate and more remote factors shows that short-term factors are often 
strongly shaped by long-term party system evolutions, and cannot be understood in isolation 
from them. Adopting such a perspective allows us to take advantage of a vast literature that 
has studied the conditions shaping the fortunes of challenger parties that are not populist (see 
also Roberts 2015). My contention is that party systems under some certain conditions 
provide space for challengers – whether of a populist type or not – while the mobilization 
space for any kind of new actor is restricted under other conditions.  
From a historical cleavage perspective, the capacity of new political actors to rally votes is 
limited by voters’ existing partisan attachments. Thus, the articulation and strength of the 
class cleavage in Western Europe was conditioned heavily by older cleavages, most notably 
religion (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Rokkan 1999, Bartolini 2000). More generally, echoing 
Schattschneider (1975 [1960]), Kriesi and Duyvendak (1995) have postulated a zero-sum 
relationship between old and new divisions. To the degree that existing divisions remain 
salient and that new divides do not reinforce, but cut across them, the party system tends to 
“organize” new issues “out of politics”, in Schattschneider’s (1975 [1960]: chap. 4) famous 
words. It is irrelevant in this respect whether existing alignments are strongly structured by 
social group membership – such as in the case of the traditional class and religious cleavages 
– or whether they are more strongly politically defined, as in the case of contemporary 
Western Europe’s over-arching economic and cultural ideological alignments (Bornschier 
2010: 57-60). As long as an individuals’ group attachments and political identities related to 
the existing structure of conflict are stronger than his or her identification with a cause that 
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draws a new group boundary – such as belonging to “the pure people” that is betrayed by the 
corrupt elite – the individuals’ political alignment will remain stable. A change in political 
preference requires a prior transformation in an individuals’ salience hierarchy of identities 
(Stryker 1980, 2000).  
The degree to which the new conflicts effectively remain latent depends on the strength of 
the collective identities entailed by the older divides, and on how strongly parties reinforce 
these collective identities by offering distinctive positions along the older divides (Bornschier 
2010: chap. 3). If patterns of competition are segmented, social groups have strong loyalties 
and party preferences (Mair 1997: 162-171). As a consequence, the electoral market is tightly 
restrained and leaves little room for the emergence of new lines of opposition or new political 
parties.1 The origin of every enduring structure of political alignments is thus a political 
conflict that has formed political group attachments.2 Two factors shape whether the existing 
structure of conflict persists or is prone to being transformed. First, the degree to which the 
original conflict persists, or, put differently, the degree to which parties continue to present 
diverging policy propositions. Conflict reinforces the group attachments that underlie political 
divides, and thus perpetuates alignments (Sartori 1968, Bornschier 2010). It nurtures the 
ideological schemas, in Conover and Feldman’s (1984) terms, that voters have in their minds 
and that help them understand politics and form preferences concerning the political issues of 
the day. There is now an impressive literature on party systems in the advanced democracies 
that underscores that conflict constitutes the reproductive mechanism underlying cleavages 
(e.g., van der Brug 2010, Evans and Tilley 2011, Adams et al. 2011, Evans and de Graaf 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  At the extreme, such a structure of opposition rules out any real competition between parties. Political 
systems characterized by pillarization, where the Netherlands used to be a prominent example, each party 
has its own constituency, and they do not really compete at all. The same is true of the pacts that were 
agreed upon in Colombia in 1958 (after the civil war known as La Violencia), and in the Punto Fijo pact in 
Venezuela in 1958. Whether loyalties persist in such a context depends on the continuing salience of the 
issues associated with the division in everyday politics, as I explain below. 
2  Coser (1956) emphasizes the group-binding functions of political conflict. I use the terms party 
identification and political group identification interchangeably as partisanship can be viewed as a social 
identity (see Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). 
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2013, Rennwald and Evans 2014). But there is also evidence from Latin America that 
polarization creates, while de-polarization dilutes the links between social groups and parties 
that stabilize party systems (e.g., Torcal and Mainwaring 2003). 
Party convergence may thus result in processes of so-called behavioral dealignment, where 
the links between segments of the electorate and a specific party are diluted and where voters 
become open for the appeals of new parties, movements, or charismatic leaders.3 In this 
scenario, voters continue to have diverging policy preferences, but these preferences are no 
longer represented by political parties. In the short term, catch-all strategies may be 
electorally rewarding, but in the medium term, parties that abandon their traditional program 
often lose significant vote shares (Karreth, Polk, and Allen 2012). In the longer run, if voters 
have nowhere else to go, party convergence will lead to a loss of confidence in the party 
system, and it may even result in a crisis of legitimacy of the entire political system. The 
established parties in such a situation are of course tempted to in some way or another inhibit 
the entry of competitors. Because they have abandoned the option of stipulating alternative 
policy proposals, which would help them to be responsive to voters’ policy preferences, they 
are left with two principal options: The first is to form an outright cartel by outlawing fringe 
parties or by introducing hurdles to the registration of new parties that are difficult to 
overcome. The other option is to substitute programmatic partisan linkages with clientelistic 
loyalties to maintain the cartel.4 Clientelism, in turn, requires financial resources that foster 
corrupt practices, which further erodes legitimacy. For this reason, this situation is prone to 
populist discourses, because populists thrive on crises of legitimacy (Hawkins 2010).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  For the distinction between behavioral and structural dealignment, see Martin (2000) and Lachat (2007). The 
transformation of existing dimensions can occur either by new political actors, or by an established party 
that seeks to redraw a party system’s dividing lines. As we will see in the Swiss case, established parties 
may even turn into populists in the process. 
4  This is actually the ideal-typical case of Katz and Mair’s (1995) cartel party thesis, a phenomenon that in 
this pure form is a more adequate description of Latin American countries such as Venezuela and Colombia, 
rather than in the Western European context, for which the theory was originally developed. 
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On the other hand, change can also come from below as a result of the evolving 
preferences of voters. The potential for new political actors to redraw the dimensions of 
competition is thus the degree to which established party system divisions resonate with the 
preferences and the concerns of the electorate. If parties represent a conflict between the 
working class and employers, then partisan attachments will fade as post-industrialization or 
the growth of the informal sector make the core constituencies along the divide shrink. 
Likewise, secularization has led to a declining share of churchgoers in the Western Europe, 
and to a declining importance of the religious cleavage. This process can be referred to as one 
of structural dealignment, because social structural change weakens the roots that parties 
have in society. If a conflict is pacified at the voter level, then political alignments will 
gradually fade even if parties continue to differ in their positions. Consequently, structural 
dealignment, like behavioral dealignment, creates space for the manifestation of new 
conflicts. This situation differs from the one above in that no cartel of any kind is formed by 
the established parties. Thus, not only new political actors can take advantage of the process 
of dealignment by drawing up new conflicts, but established parties can also seek to exploit 
new issues. This occurred with respect to the issues promoted by the populist right both in 
Germany and in Switzerland. The two cases differ, however, in that the Swiss People’s Party 
subsequently underwent a transformation into a full-fledged right-wing populist party, while 
the German Christian Democrats occupied the anti-universalistic terrain only temporarily and 
remained a center-right party (Kriesi et al. 2006, Lachat 2008, Dolezal 2008a, Bornschier 
2010). 
To summarize, populists will not be successful in a context where strong ideological 
divides are present and parties have strong links to like-minded constituencies. I argue that an 
erosion of a party system’s roots in society – and the concomitant large number of floating 
voters that results from the process of dealignment – represents a necessary condition for 
populist success. Of course, dealignment must not be sufficient to trigger the electoral 
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breakthrough of populists. For one thing, non-populist parties may mobilize the electoral 
potentials that the established parties have neglected. For instance, the success of European 
left-wing parties off the mainstream does not seem related to a populist discourse. The latter 
lends itself only to actors whose criticism of the way democracy works is an integral part of 
their electoral message – which does not seem to be the case for the radical left in Europe.  
Even when a populist challenger arises, its ability to rally a substantial proportion of the 
electorate depends on two further factors, which I deal with in this paper only briefly. The 
first is constituted by the strategies of the established parties, which stand to lose from the 
populists’ entry into the party system. This is the more situational, short-term strategic side of 
the structuralist perspective outlined in the preceding section. I touch upon this factor when 
discussing the German case. The second factor is the persuasive power of the populist 
challenger’s message, as well as other organizational features of populists are crucial in 
shaping the challenge they pose.5 These factors are not easy to study since we generally lack a 
full sample of populist challenges that includes a sufficient number of failed attempts to 
challenge mainstream parties (c.f., Rovira Kaltwasser 2015). We do know from the West 
European literature, however, that only right-wing populists adopting a “modern”, 
differentialist nativist discourse (Antonio 2000, Betz 2004, Betz and Johnson 2004), meshed 
with anti-establishment stances are electorally successful, while parties that fail to distance 
themselves clearly from traditional racism receive only marginal vote shares (Carter 2005; see 
also Ignazi 2002).  
With respect to Latin America, the parties that form part of the “left turn” on the continent 
also differ with respect to their ideology and their reliance on populist rhetoric. Drawing on 
Hawkins’ (2010) findings in the Venezuelan case, I argue that whether left-wing parties rely 
on economic policy appeals alone or whether they mesh these with an anti-establishment 
rhetoric depends on the level of citizen support in the polity. Where parties have lacked 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  In his work on the populist right, Mudde (2007), refers to these as “internal supply” factors. 
9 
responsiveness for a longer period of time, political support erodes, and populist messages 
will be successful. In those Latin American cases in which policy differentiation was absent, 
programmatic linkages between political elites and voters had become diluted, and left-wing 
populists successfully spearheaded a broad movement of discontent against the political 
system. The moderate left, on the other hand, emerged in a much more incremental process 
typical of classical mass parties. The ability of these parties to successfully compete and build 
a following tempered discontent and voters remained committed to a strategy of political 
change within existing institutions.  
 
 
Regional context and case selection 
 
The theoretical predictions explaining the populist potential based on the intensity of existing 
party system divisions are tested drawing on three Latin American and three Western 
European cases. As shown in Table 1, these cases differ in terms of populist success. Within 
each regional context, at least one case displays a successful populist party, while populists 
were not successful in at least one other country. These diverging outcomes can be traced to 
my two key independent variables, as the empirical section of this paper will seek to 
substantiate. The two regions differ, however, in that populism is associated with right-wing 
cultural ideologies in Western Europe, while left-wing populists drawing heavily on 
economic mobilization frames have triumphed in Latin America. As I have argued, this 
difference is due to the nature of the political space in the respective regions and the 
responsiveness of parties to voter preferences along these divides. In the following, I justify 
the case selection by discussing the context in which the populist right and the populist left 
emerged in Western Europe and Latin America, respectively. 
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Table 1: Cases, party system divides, and types of populist challengers 
Country/case 
Crucial period 
prior to populist 
challenge 
Dimensions of 
political space 
Content of first 
dimension 
Content of 
second 
dimension 
Type of successful 
populist challenge 
      
Western Europe      
Germany 1970s-1980s 2 Economic Cultural Not successful 
France 1970s 2 Economic Cultural Right-wing 
Switzerland 1970s/1980s 2 Economic Cultural Right-wing 
      
Latin America      
Chile 1990s 2 Regime-economic Cultural None/not successful 
Uruguay 1990s 1 Regime-economic  None/not successful 
Venezuela 1980s/1990s 1 Socio-economic  Left-wing 
Note: Evidence supporting the number of dimensions defining the political space and the substantive content of 
these dimensions is provided in the following section.  
 
Party systems in Western Europe have been marked by the conflicts triggered by the national 
and industrial revolutions (Rokkan 1999). As a result, political space has always been at least 
two-dimensional. The dimensions underlying party interactions have changed over time, 
however. While the state-market cleavage remains one of the two dimensions structuring 
party interactions (e.g., Kriesi 2006, 2008), the traditional religious cleavage has been 
transformed into a new cultural dimension of conflict. A first restructuring of the political 
space occurred as a consequence of the mobilization of the New Social Movements of the left 
in the 1970s and 1980s (Kitschelt 1994). Spurred by the educational revolution of the 1960s 
and 1970s, the diffusion of universalistic values has led actors to call for individual autonomy 
and the free choice of lifestyles (see Stubager 2008, 2009). A diffuse anti-universalistic 
counter-potential against the libertarian left had emerged already in the 1970s at the 
attitudinal level, as Sacchi (1998) has shown. But a broad conservative counter-movement to 
the libertarian left gained momentum only in the 1980s and 1990s, when right-wing populist 
parties found inspiration in the European New Right to develop a counter-ideology that 
meshes anti-universalism and strands of communitarian political thought (Bornschier 2010a, 
2010b; see also Ignazi 1992, Rydgren 2005, Minkenberg 2000). Because this background to 
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right-wing populist mobilization is specific to Western Europe, this paper does not include 
any East-Central European cases, where the driving forces of right-wing populism are 
presumably different, and where they have not adopted the differentialist-nativist discourse 
typical of their counterparts in the West. In Western Europe, empirical analyses of parties’ 
issue positions in several countries in the 1990s reveal a two-dimensional political space 
constituted by the state-market divide and the opposition between universalistic values and a 
traditionalist-communitarian defence of the traditional national community (Kriesi et al. 2006, 
2008, Bornschier 2010a, 2010b). Although these studies show the economic and cultural 
dimensions to be present in strikingly similar form all three countries I study in this paper, the 
anti-universalistic potential gave rise to the emergence of powerful parties of the extreme 
populist right in France and in Switzerland, while the corresponding potential was absorbed 
by the established right in Germany. Despite the challenge posed by the Republikaner 
(Republicans) in the 1980s, the populist right was thus unable to institutionalize in this latter 
country. I thus select the cases of France, Switzerland, and Germany in the European context.  
In Latin America, the most recent wave of populism is associated with the “left turn” of the 
late 1990s and 2000s, following an era of structural economic adjustment policies and 
austerity. While some of the left-wing parties that came to govern in the post-neoliberal era 
resemble classical mass parties that have taken decades to institutionalize, others are represent 
new political movements with that appeal to voters by mobilizing against the political 
establishment. Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter (2010) use the term “contestatory” left to 
distinguish the latter group – encompassing Chávez’ Bolivarian movement and Bolivia’s 
Movement for Socialism –from the more moderate leftist parties that governed Uruguay, 
Chile, and Brazil. While the latter respect economic constraints and political opposition, the 
contestatory left in terms of rhetoric and action presents a more profound challenge to the 
status quo. I will label the contestatory variant of the left as “populist”, following the recent 
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comparative literature (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012, Roberts 2015, Rovira Kaltwasser 
2015).6 
Thus far, there are rather few attempts to explain why moderate mass parties of the left 
have emerged in some countries and populist left parties in others (e.g., Weyland 2009). 
Remmer’s (2012) analysis suggests that demand-side factors are not particularly relevant in 
explaining the choice of moderate or contestatory left-wing ideologies by parties in various 
countries. My hypothesis is that the lack of responsiveness of the party systems in the populist 
left countries explains why an anti-political establishment mobilization was successful in 
some cases. As outlined earlier, a persistent lack of responsiveness erodes partisan loyalties 
and makes voters open for appeals by new political actors, and results in the loss of 
legitimacy that Hawkins (2010) has identified as the crucial factor driving support for Hugo 
Chávez in Venezuela. Venezuela is thus an obvious case to include in Latin America. 
Furthermore, Bolivia and Ecuador are not covered by the World Values Survey data I use, 
and thus cannot be included in the analysis at this stage. Peru, on the other hand, represents a 
prototypical case of populist mobilization, but the mid-1990s time point covered by the data is 
not ideal, as Alberto Fujimori came to power in 1991 already. A lack of data from the 1980s 
precludes an analysis of the Peruvian case. From the group of countries featuring moderate 
leftist parties, the combination of data from the PELA elite surveys and the mass-level survey 
data allows for the inclusion of Chile and Uruguay. Including Brazil, on the other hand, is 
again ruled out by a lack of appropriate data, this time on elite policy positions.  
The analysis proceeds as follows: The next section now discusses the data used and the 
research design, while the following section presents aggregate evidence on the 
responsiveness of party systems in my six cases. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  The distinction between the moderate and the populist left can be further refined by taking into account 
organizational features of these parties or movements, namely, how concentrated or dispersed authority is 
(c.f., Levitsky and Roberts 2011; see also Weyland 2010). For present purposes, it is not necessary to make 
these more fine-grained distinctions, as Roberts (2015: 142-144) points out that the concept of populism is 
compatible both with grass-roots/bottom-up and top-down/elite-directed modes of political mobilization. 
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Measuring representational congruence prior to the populist phase in the six cases 
 
One of the central junctures in the “chain of responsiveness” (Powell 2004) that runs from 
public preferences to political policies, is the congruence between voter preferences and party 
positions. According to the “responsible party model”, first theorized by the APSA 
Committee on Political Parties (1950), and synthesized by Thomassen (1994: 251-2), 
congruence is achieved if, first, parties offer diverging programmatic offerings, and second, 
voters chose parties according to these offerings. Consequently, the quality of representation 
has frequently been assessed by looking at the correspondence between the political 
preferences of voters and their representatives (e.g., Dalton, 1985; Powell, 2000; Luna and 
Zechmeister, 2005, 2010; see also Diamond and Morlino, 2005).7 This is the strategy I use 
here. To measure how responsive parties were to voter preferences prior to the phase in which 
populist parties established themselves as major political actors in France, Switzerland, and 
Venezuela, I draw on data on party positions and voter preferences. Because there are no 
unique data sets that cover both regions, the data used differs in the two contexts. Employing 
the same analytical strategy, however, the results are roughly comparable between contexts. 
Thus far, I have analyzed the phase preceding the “left turn” in Latin America, namely, the 
1990s, while in the European cases, I also have information on representational congruence 
for the 1990s and early 2000s. Extending the analysis to the 1990s allows me to demonstrate 
the persistent lack of political space for the populist right in Germany, and to assess the 
impact the populist right on representation in Switzerland and France.  
To determine party positions in Western Europe, I rely on data based on the media 
coverage of election campaigns that is derived from a coding of party positions as reported in 
newspapers during election campaigns (Kriesi et al. 2008; see Dolezal 2008b for a detailed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  A more sophisticated variant of this approach, the “thermostatic model“ (Soroka and Wlezien 2010) takes a 
dynamic perspective and investigates how changes in public policy and voter preferences interact. 
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description of the data). The data predominantly captures statements that party exponents 
make at press conferences and on other occasions, and the campaign data therefore closely 
reflects what voters actually learn of the parties’ positions. The data covers three electoral 
contests that took place between the late 1980s and the early 2000s and one election in the 
1970s. Although it does not cover the 1980s in Switzerland and Germany, this data is rather 
unique in allowing for an analysis of the phase preceding the populist challenge. The supply-
side data is complemented with survey data from national election studies. The combination 
of the information we have for party positions and voter preferences allows for an analysis of 
congruence for the 1978, 1988, 1995, and 2002 elections in France, the 1975, 1995, 1999, and 
2003 elections in Switzerland, as well as the 1976, 1994, 1998, and 2002 elections in 
Germany.  
For the Latin American cases, I draw on data from the first wave of the University of 
Salamanca Surveys of Latin American Legislators (PELA), for which face-to-face interviews 
with legislators were conducted between 1995 and 1996 (see Alcántara 2008). This point in 
time is very close to the fieldwork of the World Values Survey’s (WVS) 1994-99 wave, for 
which most interviews were also conducted in 1995 and 1996. Combining these data sources, 
it is possible to assess the congruence of representation in Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela for 
the mid-1990s, prior to the election of Hugo Chávez in 1998.  
Both for Western European and the Latin American cases, I start out by grouping the 
issue-specific items contained in the elite and mass surveys into broader, theoretically defined 
issue-categories. The categories are derived from an analysis of political space in Western 
Europe (Kriesi et al. 2008), and adapted to the Latin American context by adding the regime 
dimension. I operationalize each category separately for the political supply side and for 
voters using all available items the surveys or the media data.8 From the thirteen categories 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  In Western Europe, I use the mean of all party statements with respect to a given category, while for Latin 
America I aggregate the items in the elite surveys using principal components factor analysis. 
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defined in total, I list only those that in the later analyses of dimensionality turned out to be 
relevant either in Latin America or in Western Europe: 
 
Economic issues 
- Welfare: Expansion of or defense of a generous welfare state, support for public 
education, redistribution, and equality. 
- Budget: Budgetary rigor and tax reductions that have no redistributive effects. 
- Economic liberalism: Opposition to market regulation, and protectionism, support for 
deregulation, for more competition, and privatization. 
 
Non-economic issues 
- Regime (only relevant for Latin America): Assessment of past military regime (if there 
was a military dictatorship). The other items in the PELA elite surveys cannot be used due 
to a lack of variance. Additional issues used on the demand side: support for democracy, 
opposition against authoritarianism. 
- Army: Support for a strong national defense, against reducing the military’s budget (to 
some Latin American countries, this can be interpreted as a regime dimension as well). 
- Cultural liberalism (cultlib): Opposition to traditional moral values, support for gender 
equality, the right to abortion and divorce (Latin America). Support for the goals of the 
New Social Movements: Peace, solidarity with the third world, gender equality, human 
rights, opposition to racism (Western Europe). The category includes the opposite concept 
of cultural protectionism for Western Europe, coded inversely: Patriotism, calls for 
national solidarity, defense of tradition and national sovereignty, traditional moral values. 
- Law and order: Support for more law and order, and the fight against criminality. 
- Immigration (only relevant for Western Europe): Support for a tough immigration and 
integration policy, and for the restriction of the number of foreigners. 
 
Because the relevant dimensions of political conflict are country-specific, we should avoid 
measuring representational congruence along a priori, theoretically defined dimensions. For 
reasons of space, I do not present the analyses of the dimensionality of political space here, 
but draw on prior results.9 For Western Europe, a stable antagonism between support for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Although we label the resulting dimensions somewhat differently in our respective publications, all analyses 
carried out using the Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008) data converge in identifying the same issues that make up 
these divides (Dolezal 2008b, Lachat 2008, Bornschier 2008, 2010a, 2010b). Given the properties of the 
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welfare state and economic liberalism forms the first dimension of political space throughout 
the period of study. The second, cultural dimension is subject to change over time. In the 
1970s, the universalistic values embodied in cultural liberalism form one pole of the cultural 
dimension in all three countries. Some of the issues associated with cultural liberalism are still 
reminiscent of the traditional religious cleavage, while others were put on the political agenda 
by the New Social Movements that arose after 1968 (gender equality, human rights, 
multiculturalism). Mainstream left parties in Switzerland, France, and Germany adopted 
many of these issues and thereby underwent a transformation into so-called New Left parties. 
In both France and Germany, the ideology of the New Left is countered by a neoconservative 
position that opposes the state (i.e., the category “budgetary rigor” lies at the opposite pole to 
opposing cultural liberalism along the cultural divide). In Germany, support for the army is 
situated similarly and is also used to measure positions along the cultural divide. In 
Switzerland, on the other hand, the anti-universalistic ideology is tied to law-and-order 
stances by political parties, and consequently, this category is used alongside cultural 
liberalism to measure positions along the cultural dimension of the 1970s. From the late 
1980s onwards, the cultural dimension is defined by the antagonism between cultural 
liberalism and anti-immigration stances. It is at the immigration pole, most remote from 
cultural liberalism, that right-wing populist parties are situated. While the populist right has 
propelled the saliency of the immigration issue, this pole is present also in those countries in 
which the populist right did not succeed in breaking into the party system, at least in the 
1990s (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008, Bornschier 2010b).  
For Latin America, I draw on an assessment of the relevant dimensions of political space 
based on discriminant analysis to identify those issue categories that set legislators from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
data used in the European context, Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) is the appropriate method to assess the 
dimensionality of political space in these cases. The substantive interpretation of the resulting divides that is 
presented in the text is my own. 
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different parties apart in the PELA elite surveys (Rosas 2010, Bornschier 2013).10 In the mid-
1990s, welfare proved to be a divisive issue for parties in all three countries studied. In Chile 
and Uruguay, however, this traditional economic divide was supplemented with the regime 
question. In Uruguay, support for the army is strongly associated with market-liberal 
economic positions, while in Chile, democratic-autocratic regime preferences are strongly 
correlated with the economic divide. In Chile, a second dimension centering on the right to 
divorce and abortion is present.11 This dimension is reminiscent of the religious cleavage. In 
Venezuela, the dominant party system divide mixes economic and moral issues (again 
centering on divorce and abortion), and also encompasses different degrees of support for the 
army.  
In both contexts, I assess congruence along these country-specific dimensions by first 
measuring the mean positions of party electorates along the same dimensions. To aggregate 
issues into dimensions, I use principal components factor analysis (all methodological issues 
are explained in detail in Bornschier 2013: 55-61). The final step in the analysis is to assess 
the correspondence between the positions of parties and those of their voters. Because the 
positions of parties and voters are not measured on the same scales, this correspondence can 
be judged only in relative terms. I thus measure congruence regressing the position of the 
party the respondent voted for on his/her individual preference along a given dimension.12 
The most important information provided by this analysis is not the coefficient (which again 
is not independent of the differing scales on which parties and voters are placed), but whether 
individual preferences are a significant predictor of party choice. Consequently, I use the z-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10  In other words, discriminant analysis identifies those issue categories from the list presented above that help 
to explain legislators’ party affiliation (see Klecka 1980). 
11 The Uruguayan political space also features a second dimension, but this dimension overlaps almost 
completely with the first and is therefore difficult to interpret (see Bornschier 2013: 639). Because its 
substantive content is difficult to make sense of, and because the first dimension explains 92% of the total 
variance of the model, I only report the results for the first dimension. 
12 Technically, I attribute to each individual the policy position of his/her party, and then assess how well 
individual preferences explain the position of the party they voted for. Since the variance of the dependent 
variable is limited by the low number of parties competing, I use ordered logit instead of OLS regression. 
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statistic of the ordered logit regression as a measure for the congruence of representation that 
can be compared across countries.13 
 
 
Results: Potentials for right-wing and left-wing mobilization in Europe and Latin America 
 
We are now in a position to summarize the results of the analysis of representational 
congruence. Apart from the degree to which party positions and electoral preferences match, I 
am also interested in the extent to which partisan camps are segmented or overlapping. 
Segmented divides are characterized by strong alignments between social groups and parties 
based on solid ideological differences. Divisions of this kind are typical of long term divisions 
rooted in social structure, which we commonly refer to as cleavages (Bartolini and Mair, 
1990; Mair 1997: 162-171). In such a situation, voter mobility is limited. Parties hardly 
compete for the same voters, and campaigns serve the purpose of nourishing the subcultural 
political identities of their party constituencies. Competitive divides represent the opposite 
state of affairs: Party electorates are not strongly distinguished in terms of ideology, and 
different parties therefore target the same groups of voters. Parties then behave in ways that 
approximate Schumpeter (1993 [1942]) and Downs’ (1957) characterization of party 
competition.14 I use ideological polarization as a measure of the dimension running from 
segmentation to competition.15 Since segmentation implies not only that parties present 
distinctive programmatic platforms, but also that this distinction is rooted in contrasting voter 
positions, I use the polarization of party electorates, rather than that of parties themselves, to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Because the statistical significance of the regressions also varies as a function of sample size, I weight the z-
value by the size of the sample in the respective voter surveys.  
14  On the concept of competition, see also Bartolini (1999) and (2000). 
15 See also Dalton (2008), who argues that polarization is a key concept to characterize the nature of 
competition between parties. 
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measure segmentation vs. competition.16 In practical terms, I calculate the standard deviation 
of party electorates’ mean positions, weighted by party size.17 As discussed earlier on, I use 
the ability of voter preferences to explain the ideological position of their preferred party as a 
measure of congruence.18 
 
Latin America in the 1990s 
Figure 1 shows the position of the three Latin American cases along the dimensions of 
polarization and congruence (in Chile, where political space proved two-dimensional, each 
dimension is located separately). Values of congruence below 2 do not reach statistical 
significance, thus this is a useful cut-off point to distinguish between responsive and 
unresponsive party systems. In terms of polarization, it is difficult to define in absolute terms 
when polarization is high and when it is low, and I have rather arbitrarily drawn a line that 
runs halfway between the theoretical minimum (zero differentiation between party 
electorates) and the most polarized case in my sample (Switzerland’s new cultural divide in 
1999 with a polarization figure of roughly 0.6, see Figure 5). It is best, however, to think of 
the vertical dimension as representing a continuum.  
The results reveal that the mobilization space for populist left actors was tightly restrained 
in Chile and Uruguay, while the established parties in Venezuela provided Hugo Chávez’ 
ample space. Figure 1 shows that the regime-cum-economy divides in Uruguay and Chile 
stand out both in the degree to which parties mirror voter preferences, as well as in terms of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16  Some Latin American party systems offer clear ideological alternatives, while electorates are rather centrist 
– a situation that does not meet the characteristics associated with segmentation. Kitschelt et al. (1999) refer 
to this type of representation as “polarized trusteeship”. 
17  Party strength is derived from the PELA elite surveys for the Latin American cases and from Kriesi et al. 
(2008) as well as a number of online-sources for the European cases. 
18  Technically, I use the z-value of the ordered logit regression of parties’ programmatic positions on voters’ 
ideological preferences. The z-value is a measure for the significance of the predictions of these regressions, 
and thus depends also on sample size. Because the size of the sample varies in the European cases, where I 
rely on national election studies, I weight the z-value by sample size to arrive at a measure that is 
comparable across contexts. For Latin America, the same World Values Survey data was used for the three 
cases, and the result of the regressions are thus comparable between countries. Comparisons across the Latin 
American and European contexts are not yet possible at this stage. 
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polarization. The parties of the moderate left are an integral part of this pattern of segmented 
representation in both countries, as they occupy the state-interventionist and pro-democratic 
pole of the dominant party system divide (see Bornschier 2013; these results are not shown 
here). The latter exhibit some of the core characteristics of long-term divisions we commonly 
call cleavages. Chile’s cultural dimension, on the other hand, is substantially less segmented, 
and also structures party preferences less powerfully (though still significantly). The 
traditional religious cleavage thus clearly appears inferior in salience to the new divide that 
centers on the regime question and on economic liberalism.  
 
 
Figure 1: Congruence and Polarization along the dominant party system divides in Latin 
America, mid-1990s 
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The Venezuelan party system, on the other hand, clearly failed to mirror voter preferences 
along the socio-economic divide that meshes economic issues and cultural liberalism before 
Chávez’ successful bid for power. I have tentatively defined situations of high polarization 
and low congruence as instances of party system cartelization, while low polarization and low 
congruence is simply indicative of unresponsiveness. In Venezuela, party electorates have not 
converged in their socio-economic preferences, but parties fail to represent these differences. 
Figure 2 shows the positions of parties and voters on which this assessment is based. We see 
that on the socio-economic dimension (meshing support for the welfare state and liberal 
cultural values), the two traditional parties, Acción Democrática (AD) and Comité de 
Organización Política Electoral Independiente (COPEI), hardly differ in their locations, and 
neither do their voters. Convergencia National (CONV), a spin-off from the long-established 
COPEI, is situated close to the traditional parties. The space to the left divide is occupied by 
Causa R and Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). On the voter side, the differences between 
electorates are very small, especially given their extensive ideological overlap (the bars below 
the mean positions show the standard deviation and thus the heterogeneity of party 
electorates). Only the electorate of MAS escapes the centrist dynamic and appears in touch 
with its party’s ideological credentials.  
 
 
Congruence (z-value, 5 parties): 1.3 (p=.19) 
Figure 2: Venezuela 1995-6 – Parties and Voters on the Socio-Economic Divide 
Legend: CAUSA R, La Causa Radical; MAS, Movimiento al Socialismo; CONV, Convergencia National; AD, 
Acción Democrática; COPEI, Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente. 
AD COPEIMASCAUSA R CONV
AD COPEIMAS
CAUSA R CONV
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Overall, voters’ preferences along the socio-economic divide are unrelated to the positions 
of the parties they vote for. From this perspective, the implosion of the party system upon 
Hugo Chávez’ appearance on the political scene is not that surprising. The party system 
progressively lost its roots in society due to the failure of the two major parties to offer 
differing policy packages to voters. Although new left-wing parties gained support in the 
1980s, they seem to have been unable to present a viable alternative to AD and COPEI. MAS 
actually betrayed its electorate by joining a coalition to elect Rafael Caldera, a former COPEI 
politician, into the presidency under the banner of Convergencia National in 1993. In the 
1996 World Values Survey used to determine voter preferences, a striking 59% of 
Venezuelan respondents declare that they would vote for none of the existing parties, or 
answer “don’t know” when asked about their party preference. Thus, the institutionalized left 
was unable to re-establish confidence in party politics. 
 
Western Europe in the 1970s 
In Western Europe, the French Front National spearheaded the rise of the populist right with 
its early breakthrough in the 1984 European parliament elections. The essential period 
defining the mobilization space for the populist right is therefore the 1970s, when the New 
Left had redefined the secular pole of the religious divide into the libertarian-universalistic 
pole of the new cultural divide. The degree to which parties remained responsive to voter 
preferences amidst this shift strongly determined the appeal of the populist right, whose 
ideology meshed a traditionalist-communitarian counter-conception of community to that of 
the New Left with populist anti-establishment appeals. Figure 3 shows the degree of 
responsiveness of parties to voter preferences along the economic and cultural divides along 
with the degree of segmentation these divisions entailed. As before, I have drawn lines at a 
medium-level of polarization. In Europe, the relationship between partisan preferences and a 
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party’s policy position is always significant, but the results show that there are important 
differences in degree. For this reason, I have – again arbitrarily – drawn a vertical line which 
runs halfway between the theoretical minimum in terms of congruence (no relationship 
between voter preferences and party positions) and the most congruent case in my sample, 
namely, the cultural dimension in Switzerland in 1999 (shown in Figure 5).19 
 
 
Figure 3: Congruence and Polarization in the 1970s in Western Europe 
 
We see two contrasts in Figure 3. The first is between the economic and the cultural divides. 
The economic cleavage was characterized by strong and fairly polarized alignments between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19  Given that we are looking at differences in degree among the European cases, rather than the much more 
fundamental contrast between Venezuela and the other two Latin American cases, the labels attached to the 
four quadrants in Figure 3 are tentative and to be taken with a grain of salt. 
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voters and political parties in all three countries in the 1970s. The potential for political 
newcomers along the economic divide, in other words, was limited. Along the cultural divide, 
on the other hand, we see a clear difference between Germany and the two cases of right-wing 
populist breakthrough. In Germany, congruence along the cultural divide was even stronger 
than in the economic domain, while the degree of polarization is similar. Germany witnessed 
a “renaissance of conservatism” in the 1970s as a reaction to the 1968 student movement and 
to the formation of a social-liberal government after the 1972 election, which performed a 
policy shift regarding the communist countries in the east. Confronted with the decline of 
religiosity and a programmatic vacuum, the Christian Democrats endorsed the Zeitgeist by 
stressing the importance of the family for moral guidance, and by propagating a new 
historical and national consciousness (Grande 1988). 
The grip of the French and Swiss party systems along the cultural divide is far lower, by 
contrast. The relationship between voter preferences and party positions is significant even in 
these two cases, but in relative terms, it is clearly inferior both to that of Germany and to the 
strong effect that individual preferences have on partisan alignments along the economic 
dimension. In Switzerland, the antagonism that characterized the party system in the 1970s, 
and that ran between universalistic values and calls for law and order, did not resonate with 
voter preferences. Furthermore, all electorates are fairly centrist along this divide, resulting in 
a low level of segmentation. In France, on the other hand, party electorates are more distinct, 
possibly due to the strong role that religion still exerted on preferences with respect to cultural 
liberalism (see Bornschier 2008, p. 94, as compared to Switzerland in Lachat 2008, p. 145). 
These distinctive positions, however, are not reflected in corresponding positions of the 
political parties, as reflected in the low figure for congruence. 
Although the established right in Germany succeeded in rallying the anti-universalistic 
potential in the 1970s, the challenge by far right parties was revived in the 1980s with the 
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founding of the Republikaner party, which continued to challenge the political establishment 
into the 1990s. But not only the loyalties formed by the segmented cleavage of the 1970s 
reduced the mobilization space for the far right, sporadically reappearing polarization did as 
well. Figure 4 shows the evolution of the German party system in terms of congruence and 
polarization over time. Although congruence along the cultural divide receded in 1994, it rose 
concomitantly to an increase in polarization in the 1998 campaign, and remained at that level 
in 2002. Figure 4 suggests that the potential for realignment was actually higher along the 
economic than the cultural dimension at least until 2002, where electorates have become less 
segmented, and where the relationship between voter preferences and party positions is 
weaker than in the cultural domain. These findings go a long way in explaining the lack of 
success of right-wing populist challengers in Germany. 
 
Party systems subsequent to the right-wing populist challenge in Europe 
For the Western European cases, the data allows for an analysis of the further evolution of the 
patterns of party competition, after the entry of the populist right into the party system. 
Though not necessary to explain the breakthrough of the populist right, the results of this 
analysis speak to the question why the populist right continues to be successful in France and 
Switzerland. As Figure 5 shows, party systems in France and Switzerland have become highly 
responsive to voter preferences along the cultural divide after the institutionalization of the 
populist right at one pole of the new cultural dimension.  
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Figure 4: Congruence and Polarization in Germany along the economic (“eco”) and the 
cultural (“cult”) dimensions, 1976-2002 
 
Both congruence and polarization have increased substantially in Switzerland and France, and 
cultural conflicts have become strongly segmented in both countries. These results are in line 
with research that shows that the new cultural divide exhibits all three elements of Bartolini 
and Mair’s (1990) classical definition of a cleavage (Oesch 2008a, 2008b, Stubager 2009, 
Oesch and Rennwald 2010, Minkenberg and Perrineau 2007). The populist right forms an 
integral part of this segmented cleavage: Not only the parties themselves, but also their voters 
are situated at the traditionalist-communitarian extreme of the new cultural dimension. The 
populist right thus harbors an ideologically homogeneous group of voters along one of the 
two prime dimensions of competition in Western Europe (Bornschier 2010: 106, 142). Thus, 
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it is difficult to study the extreme populist right in isolation of the thick ideology it thrives 
upon. The traditionalist-communitarian ideology of the populist right is rooted in cultural 
transformations that have occurred since 1968, and that have profoundly reconfigured West 
European party systems.  
 
 
Figure 5: Congruence and Polarization along the new cultural divide in France and 
Switzerland, 1970s-early 2000s 
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Conclusion 
 
This paper shows that the study of the causes of populism should not be divorced from the 
thick ideologies that populists use to challenge the political establishment. Rather, the search 
for short-term factors explaining of the success and failure of populist actors should be 
embedded in a broader analysis of the ideological dimensions structuring party competition in 
a given system. There is a lot to gain from looking at the degree to which parties adequately 
represent voter preferences. Populist entrepreneurs will be able to capitalize on anti-elite 
sentiments where the established parties have lost touch with voter preferences, and where the 
programmatic alignments between parties and voters have weakened. This is a necessary, but 
not a sufficient condition for populist success, which depends on a number of further factors. 
As I have argued in this paper, an important condition is the existence of a populist figure or 
movement advocating an ideology that resonates with the attitudes of those segments of the 
electorate that no longer feel represented by the established parties. The timing of the populist 
challenge, on the other hand, may be shaped by conjunctural factors. Thus, Venezuela’s 
traditional parties had presumably been out of touch with their voters’ programmatic 
preferences for long. It was only the economic context of the 1980s and the ebbing of 
clientelistic resources that had fuelled the traditional parties’ machines that eroded system 
support and thereby provided the electoral potential for an actor like Hugo Chávez to mobilize 
against the political establishment. 
Anti-establishment mobilization took a right-wing culturalist form in Western Europe due 
to the continuing responsiveness of party systems along the traditional economic divide, and 
the opportunities offered by the waning of the religious cleavage and the new issues put on 
the political agenda by the New Left. Among the three countries studied in this paper, only in 
Germany did the established right succeed in mounting a credible alternative against the New 
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Left, containing the potential for the populist right. In France, the Front National prepared to 
seize the anti-universalistic potential already in the 1970s and achieved its breakthrough in the 
early 1980s. The Front National was a forerunner within the right-wing populist party family 
in that it offered a new culturalist ideology that subsequently diffused among other right-wing 
populists across Western Europe (Rydgren 2005). In Switzerland, the manifestation of the 
traditionalist-communitarian counter-potential to the New Left was delayed into the 1990s by 
the right-wing populists’ “long march” through the institutions of the national party 
organization (see Skenderovic 2009). But despite this difference in timing, the voters of the 
Swiss People’s Party share with those of the Front National not only their suspicion of the 
political establishment, but also their specific preferences along the cultural dimension. The 
case of the Swiss People’s Party is interesting in that an established party underwent a 
transformation into a populist party, eclipsing the smaller far right parties that had existed in 
the country since the 1970s. The institutions of direct democracy allow the populist right in 
Switzerland to retain their populist anti-establishment profile despite being a governing party 
by continuously mounting popular initiatives and referendums against the coalition 
government in which they are represented. 
In Latin America, differences in the degree to which parties represented voter preferences 
in the 1990s shaped whether moderate left or populist left parties triumphed in the “left turn” 
that swept the continent after the late 1990s. In Uruguay and Chile, moderate left parties were 
already firmly entrenched at this point. The left in Chile has been part of a rather segmented 
pattern of party competition for decades. The Frente Amplio in Uruguay and the Workers’ 
Party in Brazil, on the other hand, underwent a gradual process of growth since the 1970s, and 
finally took power in 2002 and 2004, respectively. The analysis of the Chilean and 
Uruguayan cases shows that the mobilization space for new political actors was tightly 
constrained before the “left turn” in these countries. In many contexts where the major parties 
failed to offer contrasting positions in economic policy-making, on the other hand, populist or 
30 
“contestatory” left-wing challengers appeared and were successful in their bid for power. 
Contrary to the European cases, I have not yet analyzed the further evolution of representation 
in Venezuela, and it thus remains an open question whether the party system has regained 
responsiveness in a fashion similar to what has occurred in France and Switzerland after the 
populist right had become entrenched in the system. Hawkins’ (2010) analysis of the 
Venezuelan case suggests that the supporters of Hugo Chávez lack consensus with respect to 
the populist left’s state interventionist economic policy agenda, and we would thus expect 
policy representation to have remained low in Venezuela.  
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